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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
.John B. Yea te~. 
Plaintiff and Appellaut 
Archie L. Budge, 
Defendant 
and 
Archie L. Budge, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
:\Irs. John B. Yeates, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Brief of Appellants 
Appeals No's 7851-7852 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Reference to pages of reporter's transcript) 
On September 11, 1951 Mrs. Yeates was driving her 
husband's car from Nibley to the Logan Cache Library 
in Logan. Nibley is about 5 miles south of Logan. Fnder 
the State Highway System, Utah highway No. 1 runs 
from the Idaho Line north of Logan, through Logan, 
south to Wells ville and then south through the State. 
Utah highway No. 101. runs from Logan south through 
Nibley. Thus immediately south of Logan the same 
roadway is both No. 1 and No. 101. Approximately one-
half mile south of Logan City limits, these highways 
divide and form an aln1ost perfect "Y". 
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\Vhen Mrs. Yeates left the library she drove south 
on Highways 101 and 1 and as she approched the "Y" 
at about ;) :4:> P. ~I., ~I r. Budge was approaching the 
'' Y'' from the south and traveling north into Logan 
and in a 35 mile zone ( tr. 62) at 35 mph. :Mrs. Yeates 
wa:-: going about 25. (tr. 7) 
Where the two numbered highways are consolidated 
they have four lanes. After they divide, each is a two 
lane highway. 
The two cars met at the "Y". :Mrs. Yeates attemp-
ed to keep in her lane and stay on No. 101 by turning 
her car to the left of center of the intersection, and to 
the left of :Mr. Budge, (tr. 9) to avoid a head on collision. 
But, Mr. Budge tried to turn to his right of the center 
of the intersection, and to pass in front of Mrs. Yeates, 
who seeing there was about to be a wreck applied her 
brakes in an attempt to avoid the accid~nt. (tr. 9). She 
waD practically stopped when str~k. She had been 
following an ambulance traveling in front of her. 
~lrs. Yeates signaled that she was going to turn 
left in order to get into the left lane of the southbound 
traffic ( tr. 16) and Budge was approaching and about 
on the intersection ( tr. 18) at about 35 mph. He had 
clear vision on the road and traffic to the Citr LimitD 
of Logan, Y-4 to Y2 mile. He saw the ambulance, but did 
not know whether it would take highway No. 1, or 101 
(tr. 63), thought it had the right of way, but he did not 
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~low down for )Irs. Yeates because he thought he had 
the right of way over her ( tr. 72). 
(There wa~ son1e confusion in the Court's n1ind about 
the pleadings ( tr. 73, 7 4), and the Lower Court reversed 
it's decision of non-suit when the fact wa::-; called to 
his mind that ~~ rs. Yeate~ wa~ not acting as agent 
for :Jlr. Yeates and before this was cleared up, the 
Court stated: •' The 1notion for a nonsuit -against l\1 r. 
Yeates-is granted a~ to the cmnplaint and the counter-
clainl. \Ye '11 1nake then1 (Budge) go forward and see 
whether or not the defendant can extricate himself from 
the legal dilennna he finds himself in, and whether you 
can clear hin1 of the imputation of proximate causation 
on his part so as to entitled him to a verdict". (tr. 62).) 
Budge could have let :Mrs. Yeates pass in front of 
him or he could have passd to her left ( tr. 73), but he 
tried to pass in front of her and in so doing struck her 
broadside on the East side of the highway. 
:\Jr. Yeates brought the suit against Budge for dam-
age to his car, and Budge brought a suit against Mrs. 
Yeates for the damage to his car. The Court consoli-
dated the trials, and all parties have stipulated that 
the two appeals might be consolidated. 
STATE11EN'r OF POINTS 
That the court erred as follows : 
Point 1. (No. 7851) By making it's judgment in 
favor of defendant and against the plaintiff. 
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Point 2. (No. 7851) By making it's finding Xo. 4 
to the effect that the sole proxirnate cause of 
the accident was the negligence of Bertha Yea-
tes in making a left hand turn at the inter-
section in front of defendant's vehicle and when 
defendant's vehicle was in such close proximity 
to Yeates' vehicle as to constitute an irnrnediate 
hazard, and in rnaking it's conclusion of law 
No.1. 
Point 3. (7851) In failing to make a finding that 
defendant's negligence was a concurrent and 
contributing proxirnate cause of the accident, 
and failing to enter judgment in favor of plain-
tiff and against defendant, and assessing darn-
ages accordingly. 
Point 1. (No. 7852) By making and entering it's 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against de-
fendant in any surn whatsoever. 
Point 2. (No. 7852) By making it's findings Nos. 
3 & 5 in that the Court found that plaintiff's 
injuries were caused h:~ the negligence of de-
fendant, which was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. 
Point 3. (No. 7852) By failing to find that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence which 
proximately caused his darnages barring his 
recovery, and by making it's conclusion of law, 
No.2. 
ARGUMENT. 
The argument herein contained will consider all of 
the Statement of Points together bcause there is only 
one question-i. e. was Mr. Budge guilty of negligence 
and was his negligence a contributing proximate causE· 
of the wreck. 
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~\11 through the case 1ny opponents went on the 
theory that nry client \Ya~ 1naking a left turn into 
highway X o. 101. Thi~ i~ not the fact. She wa~ on high-
way Xo. 101 and wat' going to renmin on it. She was 
making no turnt' whatsoever in the sense that she wa;-: 
leaYing one highway to turn into another. 
The question of who entered the intersection first is 
section is so vague that this question could not be 
answered at the trial. 
Pertinent statutes are as follows: 
37-7-113 (a) UCA, 1943. "No person shall 
drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater 
than is reasonable and prudent under the con-
ditions and having. regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing .In every event 
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary 
to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or 
other conveyance on or entering the highway 
in cmnpliance with legal requirements and the 
duty of all persons to use due care. 
57-7-113 (c) (as amended by the laws of 1951) 
'' ':Phe driver of every vehicle shall, consistent 
with the requirements of sub-division (a) of 
this section, dr·ive at an appropriate reduced 
speed when approaching and crossing an inter-
section ..... '' 
57-7-130 (b) (as amended by the laws of 1949) 
"At any intersection where traffic is permitted 
to move in both directions on each roadway 
left turn shall be made in that portion of the 
right half of the roadway nearest the center 
line thereof and hy passing to the right of such 
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center line where it enters the intersection and 
after entering the intersection the left turn shall 
be made so as to leave the intersection to the 
right of the center line of the roadway being 
entered. Whenever practicable the left turn 
shall be made in that portion of the intersection 
to the left of the center of the intersection". 
I will refer to the two cases by the names of the 
plaintiff in each. In the Yeates case the Court made 
the following finding: 
"that the defendant (Budge) negligently oper-
ated his vehicle in driving the same too fast for 
existing conditions, but that the sole proximate 
cause of the accident w a s the negligence of 
Bertha Yeates in making a left turn at the inter-
section in front of the defendant's vehicle and 
when the defendant's vehicle was in such close 
proximity to the YeateR vehicle as to constitute 
an immediate hazard.'' 
While in the Budge case we find the following find-
ing (No. 2 & 4). 
''the defendant Mrs. John B. Yeates negligently 
by failing to keep a proper lookout, by turning 
left into the plaintiff's lane of traffic when the 
automobile of the plaintiff was so close as to 
be an immediate hazard, drove an automobile 
into the auton1obile of the plaintiff ...... (4) 
That the plaintiff was negligent in driving hi~ 
automobile at an excessive rate of speed at the 
said intersection''. 
I am mindful of the n1ost recent case from this 
Court which is not yet in the reports. Lynn W. Mar-
tin, plaintiff v. Paul H. Stevens, defendant. No. 7731. 
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That ea~P does not control here because the Court 
there specifically held that the plaintiff had the right 
·~· 
of way. In this case the Court said: 
• 'the negligence, or 1uanner of driving, of the 
other driver was such that the driver apprais-
ing the situation "·a~ alerted to it or by using 
due care would have been 80 alerted in time so 
that by the exercise of ordinary precaution he 
could have avoided the collision.'' 
In that case this Court extensively reviewed the In-
tersection cases, and cases involving negligence as a 
matter of law. and it is not necessary to again cite 
and quote from each case. In the present caE'e the 
Court found Budge guilty of negligence in speeding 
into the intersection. It was not for the negative ques-
tion of failing to see son1ething he should have seen. 
It must be kept in mind that courts constantly talk 
of the "favored driver". In our case there is no such 
driver. Budge had no reason to know or expect which 
highway Mrs. Yeates would take (tr. 78), and Budge 
testified: 
Q. Now, Mr. Budge, \Vhen you came up the high-
way on the day of this accident, who do you 
calculate or believe had the right of way~ 
A. 1V ell, there wasn't no reason to believe there 
was anybody had the right of (way). I see the 
ambulance come along the road and there was 
a car imn1ediately ahead of me. I'd sa~· about 
probably three hundred feet, and as I met the 
ambulance just about opposite the Phillips 66 
Service Station, about the pumps, and I pro-
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ceeded on through the intersection, and I would 
judge 1\frs. Yeate's car was about-oh, when I 
1net the ambulance I guess about five or 600 
feet down t hP road." 
He see1ned to be confused and had no idea, (in his 
mind) which highway Mrs. Yeates was going to take. 
She was not passing any vehicles as she entered the 
intersection, but was in her left lane, so that Budge 
should have concluded that she would follow highway 
101 to Nibley (tr. 46 & 47). But, he did nothing. He 
kept up his speed, which the Court specifically found 
was too fast. He did not even turn or apparently not 
attempted a turn. (tr. 43 & 44) "A. His (Budges 
skid marks) didn't have any angle. They came straight 
up the road." (Note reporters map-last page of tran-
script.) 
It appears to me that the question here is: Can a 
person cross an intersection at an excessive speed for 
conditions of the intersection, have a wreck in the inter-
section, and still not be guilty of negligence which 
substantially contributed to the accident~ Budge testi-
fied: (tr. 72) Q. 
Q. Well, you said before you didn't know wheth-
er the ambulance was going to turn into 101 or 
into highway 1, so you slowed down. 
A. Well, the ambulances have the right of way on 
all roads regardless of which (way) they're going 
or where. You're supposed to give them the right 
of way. 
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Q. Oh, I see. You gave the ambulance the right 
of way'? 
..:\.. I wasn't in the intersection then. I slowed 
down to nmke ~nue I wouldn't be in the inter-
section at the tilne the a1ubulance passed through 
there. 
Q. But, you didn't slow down for Mrs. Yeates f 
A. rrhere was no signal or anything that she was 
going to cross then. 
Q. There was no signal by the mnbulance ~ 
A. The ambulance doesn't have to give one. He 
can cross any road at any time without any 
signal. 
..:\.. I knew an ambulance or a doctor or anything 
had the right of way. 
Q. But you did believe the ambulance had the 
right of way, over you, but you had it over Mrs. 
Yeates~ 
A. I believe I had the right of way coming into 
the intersection but :Mrs. Yeates hadn't indicated 
she was going to cross the intersection, and I 
could have yielded to her if I would have known''. 
I conceed the proposition that the mere exceeding 
of a speed limit does not always bar a recovery by 
the one exceeding the li1nit. That is because the ex-
cess speed may not be a negligent operation of the 
vehicle. But, where at an intersection the excess speed 
is negligent, and places the car at the exact point of 
impact, then it does bar arecovery. This point is well 
stated in All American Bus Lines v. Saxon, (Okla.) 
172 P. 2d 424 where the Court said: 
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''Possibly the bus driver could not he charged 
with negligence because of any act committed 
after being confronted with a sudden emergency, 
placing his bus and his passengers in a position 
of peril, but if he was negligent in operating~ 
the bus at an excessive rate of speed such a~ 
was instrumental in bringing about the emer-
gency and creating the position of peril, the bus 
driver was not excusable.'' 
The reason Budge could not turn to the left of the 
center of the intersection as the statute requires him 
to do, was because of his excessive speed, as found 
by the Court; it was not because it was impractical 
to do so. Instead, he deliberately tried to turn right 
of the center and in front of :Mrs. Yeats. He might 
avoid the consequences of a mistake in judgment in 
an emergency, but not when his own negligence creates 
the emergency. This is well stated in Allen v Schultz, 
(Wash.) 181 P. 916: 
'' The cause of his (driver) being placed in the 
perilous situation and his acts in extricating him-
self therefrom are disclosed by his own testi-
mony. Since the testimony shows conclusively 
that he was guilty of negligence, there was no 
question for the jury.'' 
The finding in our case was that Mrs. Yeates had 
turned suddenly in such a manner as to cause an im-
mediate hazard, and then the Court finds, in both 
cases that Budge was guilty of negligence by excess-
ive speed, and too fast for existing conditions. Had the 
Court found Budge free from negligence, some reason 
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could I:'Xi~t for the decision, but finding negligence i~ the 
~ame a~ finding that Rudge did not act with due caution 
and diligence. 
Turning to the evidence we find that .\lrs. Yeate~ 
wa:' 190 feet awa:~ fr01n Budge when he began to notice 
her (tr. :-)1). ICing testified for Budge: "Q. Was there 
any ob:'truction whatsoever on the highwa:· that would 
create a hazard had he driven to her west~ A. No.'' 
And yet he struck ~Irs. Yeates while still tr~veling at 
the rate of 20 1nph sliding his tires for 41 feet, and 1\frs. 
Yeates had slid hers for 37 feet. (tr. 109). 
Gambrel v. Duensing, (Cal.) 16 P. 2a284, is a case 
where a 1notorist came up o n some horsemen from 
their rear. A horse slipped and the motorist tried to 
avoid responsibility by invoking the doctrine of sud-
den emergency. 
''In other words, if one who fails to exercise 
ordinary precautions when approaching or about 
to pass an animal is suddely confronted with 
additional peril by reason of the movement of 
that animal, and injury results therefrom, re-
sponsibility is not lifted from the shoulders of 
the one failing to exercise such reasonable pre-
cautions.'' 
This rule is probably better stated in the Cali-
fornia case of Throw bridge v. Briggs, 35 P. 2d 
426. ''This doctrine is not available to them, as 
it is never available to relieve one from the 
consequences of a vehicular collision unless he 
is himself otherwise without negligence.'' 
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Apparently the lower Court went astray by the hold-
ing in the Cederloff case decided by this Court. ( tr. 115). 
Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P. 2d 777. Here the defendant 
was making a left turn (not at an intersection) directly 
in the line of plaintiff's car. 
The Court in that case held that even though plain-
tiff had kept a proper lookout he could not have done 
other than he did. Furthermore, that case went on the 
theory of a left hand turn into opposing traffic. There 
is no question of a turn in this case. No finding "·a:-: 
nmde in the Cederloff case of the plaintiff's negligence. 
In fact the holding was that plaintiff was free from 
negligence because he had no other course he could take, 
regardless of what defendant had done. Apply that 
reasoning to our case. The other course Budge could 
have taken was to have driven in a cautious manner, 
and if he had done so no accident could possibly have 
happened. 
I have tried to find a Utah case parallel to this 
where there was a specific finding of negligence, which 
negligence had placed a party in a position of peril, 
or given rise to an emergency created by the party 
trying to recover, but am unable to do so. 
It should be kept in mind that in this case Budge 
struck :Mrs. Yeates when she was practically stopped 
(tr. 9), and that she could do nothing to avoid the 
impact. When Budge belatedly realized there was go~ 
ing to be a crash he turned in the wrong direction ( tr. 
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-!8). He should have given the situation at the inter-
;:;c·ction his attention a~ stated in the vVashington case 
of Tacket v. l\Iilburn, 218 P. 2d 298: 
(Appellant was following a car too closely) "His 
duty was to give his attention to this situation. 
When he belatedly returned his eyes to the car 
ahead an emergency existed, but it was one of 
his own making, and he cannot avail himself 
of the emergency rule''. 
Budge had no right to assume that 1\frs. Yeates 
would take highway No. 1. He travelled the highway 
five times a week, between Ogden and Logan (working 
in Ogden-going in the mornings and returning at about 
this time at evening) and knew all of the travel over 
101 to Nibley, :Millville, Providence, Hyrun1, Paradise 
and Avon, from Logan (tr. 49). One of the few places 
left in Utah where travel is to the right of the center 
of the intersection is around the Brigham Young Monu-
ment in Salt Lake City. The old buttons in the center of 
the intersections have all been removed, and the law 
changed accordingly, so that cars that come to an 
intersection shall pass to the left of the center when-
ever practicable. It would be inconcievable to do other-
wise at this intersection, and the only reason why this 
was not done was because of the excessive speed of 
Budge. 
There are countless cases on the subject at hand, 
and many of these have been collected in the Annota-
tion in 77 ALR 582. However, unless a case almost 
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exactly in point is found, they do not appear to bt! 
n1uch help by applying generalities. 
A case exactly in point is found in the recent ca:;(l 
of Graham v. Roderick, (Wash.) 202 P. 2d 253. 1,hh~ 
court said: 
''Therefore, what appellant now asks is that we 
hold that the preponderance of the evidence sup-
ports a ruling that the aqcident would have hap-
pened if, rather than traveling at some speed 
in excess of 35 miles per hour, he had been 
proceeding at the legal rate of 25 miles per hour. 
We may agree that what appellant contends for 
is a possibility, but under the evidence in the 
record it is too remote a possibility, to allow us 
to conclude that his excessive speed was not a 
contributing proximate cause of the collision .... 
Since appellant, while traveling at a speed in 
excess of 35 miles per. hour, observed r~spon­
dent's car in time to slow down and swerve to 
his left so as to deal only a glancing blow, al-
though at the time he thought he could avoid 
the impact entirely, it is more than probable, 
in fact almost certa)in, that, if appellant had 
been traveling at the legally prescribed rate, the 
collision would have been averted.'' 
That case is very interesting because it involves a 
driver making a '' U'' turn on an arterial highway. In 
our case both highways were are arterial. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Geo. D. Preston, 
.Attorney for appellants. 
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